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Abstract
I have recently argued that if the causal theory of reference is true, 
then, on pain of absurdity, no normative ethical theory is true. In 
this journal, Michael Byron has objected to my reductio by appealing 
to Frank Jackson’s moral reductionism. The present essay defends my 
reductio while also casting doubt upon Jackson’s moral reductionism.
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In “Right-making and Reference”, I argue that if the causal theory 
of reference is true, then, on pain of absurdity, no normative ethical 
theory is true (Long 2012). The causal theory of reference (CTR, 
henceforth) holds that a term ‘T’ rigidly designates a property F iff 
the use of ‘T’ by competent users of the term is causally regulated by 
F.1 For example, since being H2O causally regulates the competent 
use of ‘is water’, ‘is water’ rigidly designates being H2O. A norma-
tive ethical theory, by contrast, is a theory that attempts to specify 
which property or properties are the fundamental right-making 
properties (FRM-properties, henceforth). A property is an FRM-
property iff it is purely descriptive and is such that, if possessed by a 
right action, is what ultimately explains the action’s being right. For 
example, utilitarianism implies that there is exactly one FRM-prop-
erty, viz., maximizing aggregate pleasure: According to utilitarian-
ism, maximizing aggregate pleasure is what makes all and only right 
actions right. Since a normative ethical theory attempts to specify 
1 See, e.g., Boyd 1988, Kripke 1980, and Putnam 1975.
Joseph Long194
which purely descriptive properties are FRM-properties, then if no 
property is an FRM-property, no normative ethical theory is true. I 
argued that CTR implies, on pain of absurdity, that no property is an 
FRM-property and, thus, that no normative ethical theory is true. 
In this journal, Michael Byron (2014) has objected to my reductio by 
appealing to Frank Jackson’s moral reductionism. The present essay 
defends my reductio while also casting doubt upon Jackson’s moral 
reductionism.
1 A reductio
I begin with a summary of my earlier argument, which relies upon 
the following two assumptions:
(A1) A property is an FRM-property only if the moral property  
 of being right exists.
(A2) The moral property of being right exists only if our term   
 ‘is right’ refers to it.
Regarding the first assumption, if the property of being right does 
not exist, then no property can make an action right, in which case 
no property can be right-making. Thus, (A1). As for (A2), its denial 
is this:
(~A2) The moral property of being right exists, but our term ‘is  
 right’ does not refer to it.
Claiming (~A2) amounts to denying that the relation between ‘is 
right’ and being right is a reference relation, which denial would un-
dermine CTR’s motivation. So, for the purposes of this essay, we 
can assume (A2). With (A1) and (A2) in hand, here is my argument 
in truncated form:
(P1) There is a true normative ethical theory only if there is an  
 FRM-property.
(P2) If there is an FRM-property, then it causally regulates the  
 competent use of ‘is right’.
(P3) If an FRM-property causally regulates the competent use of 
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 ‘is right’, then, assuming (A1) and (A2), CTR implies that  
 the FRM-property is identical to the property of being right.
(P4) An FRM-property’s being identical to the property of be-  
 ing right entails absurdity.∴   (C) Either no normative ethical theory is true, or CTR is false.
As construed, the argument is valid. So, let us consider each prem-
ise. We have already seen the argument for (P1): since a normative 
ethical theory attempts to specify which purely descriptive proper-
ties are FRM-properties, no such theory is true if there is no FRM-
property.
Premise (P2) results from an inductive inference. Suppose, for 
ease, that there is exactly one FRM-property, in which case ‘is right’ 
applies to all and only actions possessing the FRM-property. If ‘is 
right’ applies to all and only actions possessing the FRM-property, 
then the competent use of ‘is right’ at least “tracks” the FRM-prop-
erty. For example, if maximizing aggregate pleasure is the one and 
only FRM-property, then the competent use of ‘is right’ “tracks” 
maximizing aggregate pleasure. Presumably, the best explanation of 
this tracking behavior is that the FRM-property causally regulates 
the competent use of ‘is right’. So, (P2) is probably true.
Turning to (P3), trivially an FRM-property causally regulates the 
competent use of ‘is right’ only if an FRM-property exists. Accord-
ing to (A1), an FRM-property exists only if the property of being 
right also exists. So, given (A1), it follows that if an FRM-property 
causally regulates the competent use of ‘is right’, then the property 
of being right exists. Now, according to (A2), if the property of be-
ing right exists, then our term ‘is right’ refers to it. So, together 
(A1) and (A2) imply that if an FRM-property causally regulates the 
competent use of ‘is right’, then ‘is right’ refers to the property of 
being right. But CTR implies that if an FRM-property causally regu-
lates the competent use of ‘is right’, then ‘is right’ rigidly designates 
the FRM-property, which in turn implies that the FRM-property is 
identical to being right. Therefore, (P3): together (A1), (A2), and 
CTR imply that if an FRM-property causally regulates the com-
petent use of ‘is right’, then the FRM-property is identical to the 
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property of being right.
According to (P4), however, an FRM-property’s being identical 
to being right entails absurdity. My main support for (P4) is that,
(P4*) The “property that explains an action’s being right cannot  
 be identical to the property of being right” (2012: 278).
2 Jackson’s moral reductionism
Byron, however, objects. The objection as I understand it has two 
parts: the first aims at casting doubt upon (P4*), while the second 
tries to show that (P4*) is actually false. To cast doubt upon (P4*), 
Byron essentially shows that the following universal statement, of 
which (P4*) is an instance, is false:
(UI) For any two properties F and G, the F that explains x’s hav- 
 ing G cannot be identical to G.
Here is a counterexample to (UI): the property of being an Apatosau-
rus explains an organism’s being a Brontosaurus, but being an Apatosau-
rus is identical to being a Brontosaurus.2 Indeed, the property of being 
an Apatosaurus explains an organism’s being a Brontosaurus precisely 
because being an Apatosaurus is identical to being a Brontosaurus. So, 
(UI) is false. But showing that (UI) is false shows only that, for some 
properties F and G, it is possible that F = G and having F explains 
having G. It might be that the particular explanatory relation cited 
in (P4*) between the property that explains an action’s being right 
and the property of being right prevents identifying these particular 
properties with each other. So, showing that (UI) is false might—if 
anything—make one suspicious of (P4*), but anything more than 
mere suspicion is unwarranted. Consequently, Byron needs to ad-
dress (P4*) specifically.
In the second part of his objection, Byron tries to show that (P4*) 
2 Byron makes the same point in terms of being the morning star and being 
the evening star (Byron 2014: 142); however, putting the point in terms of being 
a Brontosaurus and being an Apatosaurus would better support Byron’s point, since 
the present discussion is about property-identity rather than object-identity. (It is 
worth noting that whether the natural kinds Brontosaurs and Apatosaurus are identi-
cal has just come into question; see Tschopp et al. 2015.)
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is false. To do so, Byron appeals to Frank Jackson’s (1998) moral 
reductionism.3 Here is how Byron describes Jackson’s view. First, as 
Byron rightly states, Jackson’s view holds that “normative properties 
are reducible to descriptive properties because the former constitute 
a proper subset of the latter” (Byron 2014: 142).4 Furthermore, as 
Byron claims, “Jackson defines descriptive properties as those that 
can be picked out by descriptive predicates” (Byron 2014: 142). In 
conclusion, Byron quotes Mark Schroeder as saying, Jackson’s re-
ductionism “‘amounts to the claim that normative properties can 
be picked out by uncontroversially descriptive predicates. This is a 
perfectly coherent view’” (Byron 2014: 142; Schroeder 2003: 10; 
emphasis in the original). What is more, claims Byron, Jackson’s re-
ductionism can “underwrite” the explanatory relation between being 
right and the FRM-property to which being right is identical (Byron 
2014: 142-143). For, if—as Jackson’s view implies—being right is a 
proper subset of purely descriptive properties, then should we dis-
cover that an FRM-property term picks out that proper subset, we 
can conclude that the FRM-property term’s referent—that is, the 
FRM-property—is identical to being right.5 “Far from being impos-
3 Byron initially considers an objection according to which, basically, a prop-
erty F could be both an FRM-property and identical to being right since (i) F’s 
being an FRM-property could amount to F’s playing the right-making role, (ii) 
F’s playing the right-making role could amount to F’s constituting the property of 
being right, and (iii) property-constitution could be a form of property-identity. 
I set aside this objection by Byron for two reasons. First, there are good reasons, 
none of which Byron addresses, to doubt that property-constitution could be a 
form of property-identity (see, e.g., Baker 2007: 111-116; Brink 1989: 157-158). 
But, second, given his appeal to Jackson’s moral reductionism, which does not 
invoke property-constitution, Byron is able to avoid thorny questions about prop-
erty-constitution altogether.
4 Relevant to n. 3 above, the term ‘constitutes’ in the quote from Jackson does 
not refer to a relation between particular properties. Indeed, as far as I know, 
Jackson never invokes property-constitution to describe the relation between 
two particular properties.
5 This is a charitable interpretation of Byron. Literally, Byron has us first sup-
pose that “value-maximizing is the (descriptive) FRM, and that Jackson is right 
to think that the normative property of rightness is reducible to a descriptive 
property” (2014: 143). Byron then claims, “It follows that...rightness is [identical 
to] value-maximizing” (2014: 143). But just because rightness reduces to some 
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sible or absurd as Long claims, that result would be informative and 
illuminating” (Byron 2014: 143).
To evaluate Byron’s argument, we must recognize, first, that 
Jackson’s reductionism does not merely amount to “the claim that 
normative properties can be picked out by uncontroversially de-
scriptive predicates,” as Byron quotes Schroeder as asserting. For, 
if that were all that Jackson’s reductionism amounted to, then Jack-
son’s view would also imply that normative properties are reducible 
to geometrical-shape properties since one could use a geometrical-
shape property-term—‘is a triangle’, for example—to pick out the 
normative property of, say, being right. But showing that one could 
use ‘is a triangle’ to refer to being right does not show that being 
right is reducible to being a triangle; it shows only that one can use ‘is 
a triangle’ equivocally. To avoid counting the equivocal use of a term 
as a form of reduction, Jackson’s view needs to show that the prop-
erty of being right could turn out to be identical to an FRM-property 
regardless of which terms refer to which properties.
As it turns out, Jackson’s view of properties purports to do pre-
cisely this. On Jackson’s view, properties are basically sets of pos-
sible objects.6 For example, the property of being a triangle would 
be the set of all possible triangles; being a Brontosaurus would be the 
set of all possible Brontosauruses; and being right would be the set 
of all possible right actions. Now, presumably every possible right 
action possesses some purely descriptive property; however, some 
possible actions with a purely descriptive property are not right ac-
tions. Therefore, if properties are sets, then being right will turn out 
to be a proper subset of the union of purely descriptive properties. 
Of course, if properties are sets, then an FRM-property is itself a 
set: the set of all possible actions with the FRM-property. But all 
and only right actions have an FRM-property. So, should proper-
ties turn out to be sets, then any FRM-property will be a subset of 
being right: If there are multiple FRM-properties, then each FRM-
property will be a proper subset of being right; and if there is exactly 
purely descriptive property, it does not follow that rightness reduces specifically 
to the FRM-property.
6 See Jackson 1998: 125-128. McNaughton and Rawling 2003 also contains a 
useful discussion Jackson’s view of properties.
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one FRM-property—perhaps maximizing expected hedonic value, 
to use Jackson’s example—then the FRM-property will turn out to 
be identical to being right. Now, to be sure, Byron mentions that on 
Jackson’s view being right is a proper subset of purely descriptive 
properties, and obviously being right could be such a subset only if 
being right is itself a set. But it needs to be emphasized that Jackson’s 
view of properties qua sets is what allows Jackson to identify being 
right with an FRM-property. Consequently, here is how Byron’s ob-
jection to (P4*) should go:
(1) It is coherent that,
 (i) the property of being right is the set R of all and only  
 possible right actions,
 (ii) the property of maximizing expected hedonic value is  
 the set D of all and only possible actions that maximize ex- 
 pected hedonic value, and
 (iii) all and only members of R are also members of D.
(2) If (1), then being right could turn out to be identical to  
 maximizing expected hedonic value.
(3) If being right could turn out to be identical to maximizing  
 expected hedonic value, then an FRM-property can be  
 identical to being right.∴  (4) An FRM-property can be identical to being right.
If (4) is true, then the property that explains an action’s being right 
can be identical to the property of being right, which is precisely 
what (P4*) denies. As construed, the argument is valid. Further-
more, I will grant premises (2) and (3) and argue against (1), to 
which I now turn.
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3 Objecting to (1) and defending (P4*)
At first, one might be tempted to object to (1) on the grounds that it 
allows a property to be both normative and purely descriptive. For, 
if being right is identical to R, and maximizing expected hedonic 
value is identical to D, then if R and D are identical to each other, it 
will turn out that being right is normative iff maximizing expected 
hedonic value is normative and that maximizing expected hedonic 
value is purely descriptive iff being right is purely descriptive. But 
allowing a property to be both normative and purely descriptive, the 
objection would continue, obliterates the is/ought divide between 
properties.
Unfortunately for our would-be objector, this is not so much an 
objection as just a part of Jackson’s view. For, as Byron rightly states, 
Jackson defines a normative property as a property that can be picked 
out by a normative property-term, and a purely descriptive property 
as a property that can be picked out by a purely descriptive property-
term.7 So, on Jackson’s view, the is/ought divide is located at the 
level of property-terms. But if a normative property-term applies to 
all and only the members of a set of possible actions to all and only 
of which a purely descriptive property-term applies, then—again as-
suming that properties are sets—it follows that the set in question 
is a normative and purely descriptive property. By itself, that is no 
objection to Jackson’s view; it is, rather, just part of the view, and 
that part is at least coherent.
Nonetheless, one might still challenge Jackson’s view of norma-
tive properties qua sets of possible actions. There are two ways to do 
this: one can try to show that Jackson’s view of properties is simply 
false, or, more modestly, one can argue that Jackson’s view cannot 
adequately account for normative properties.8 I will take the sec-
ond tack. But I will also show that Jackson’s view fails for the same 
7 See Byron 2014: 142 and Jackson 1998: 120-121.
8 As an example of taking the first tack, see Elliott Sober 1982. Jackson con-
siders a variation of Sober’s case and responds (1998: 126-127). The second tack 
is more modest since Jackson’s general view of properties could be true and yet 
fail to account for normative properties because normative properties do not ex-
ist (see, e.g., Mackie 1977 and Joyce 2006).
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reasons that (P4*) is true. So, the argument I shall develop will si-
multaneously show that (1) is false and give support to my original 
(2012) argument.
As stated above, the particular explanatory relation between the 
property that explains an action’s being right and the property of 
being right might make it impossible to identify these two particular 
properties with each other. I will now show why the explanatory 
relation between these two properties does indeed, as (P4*) claims, 
make it impossible to identify them with each other. First, consider 
that an action is right just in case it is justified. This is so presum-
ably because being right and being justified, as properties of actions, 
are one and the same property—to be right just is to be justified. 
It is a platitude, furthermore, that actions are justified for reasons: 
if an action is justified, there is a reason it is justified. (Call such 
reasons ‘justifying reasons’.9) Given that justifying reasons are what 
justify actions, we cannot identify a justifying reason with the fact 
that an action is justified. For, to do so would entail claiming this: 
that which justifies the action is identical to the fact that the action 
is justified. But that claim is incoherent. The fact that an action is 
justified cannot be that which justifies the action. It is worth not-
ing that this sort of incoherence is not peculiar to justification. For 
example, it holds equally for explanation: That which explains an 
event cannot be identical to the fact that the event is explained. That 
an event is explained cannot be what explains the event. Similarly, 
that an action is justified cannot be what justifies the action. Since 
being right is identical to being justified, it thus follows that an ac-
tion’s justifying reason cannot be identical to the fact that the action 
is right. An action’s justifying reason, that is, must be distinct from 
the fact that the action is right. Now, on what is probably the most 
common view of justifying reasons, a justifying reason is a fact that 
9 Justifying reasons should be distinguished from so-called explanatory rea-
sons, the latter of which often appeal to the psychological states of the agent per-
forming the action: the (explanatory) reason the agent performed that action is 
that (say) the agent had a certain belief-desire pair. The term ‘explanatory reason’ 
is infelicitous, given that justifying reasons can also figure into explanations—
namely, they explain why an action is justified. Indeed, that justifying reasons are 
also explanatory in this way is important for the present argument.
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counts conclusively in favor of an action.10 For example, if the fact 
that an action maximizes expected hedonic value counts conclusively 
in favor of the action, then that fact is what justifies the action. But 
even if justifying reasons should be facts, a justifying reason cannot 
be identical to the fact that an action is right. For, whether or not a 
justifying reason is a fact, identifying an action’s justifying reason 
with the fact that the action is right entails identifying that which jus-
tifies the action with the fact that the action is justified, which again 
is incoherent. The fact that an action is justified cannot be that which 
justifies the action. It follows, then, that whether or not justifying 
reasons are facts, we cannot, on pain of incoherence, identify an ac-
tion’s justifying reason with the fact that the action is right.
We are now in a position to see why, as per (P4*), we cannot 
identify the property that explains an action’s being right with the 
property of being right and, thus, why (1) is false. Henceforth, let us 
assume the platitude that actions are justified for reasons—which, 
for ease, I shall take to be facts—and that being right is identical 
to being justified. From these two assumptions, we get our first 
premise:
(~1.1) An action is right only if a fact justifies the action.
Now, as explained above, it is incoherent to identify the fact that 
justifies an action with the fact that the action is right. So, here is our 
second premise:
(~1.2) If a fact justifies the action, then identifying the fact that  
 justifies the action with the fact that the action is right is   
 incoherent.
Our final premise is this:
10 Theorists who either identify justifying reasons with facts or take facts to 
“give” justifying reasons include Broome (2004), Dancy (2000), Darwall (1983), 
McNaughton and Rawling (2003), Parfit (1997), Raz (1975), and Shafer-Landau 
(2003). For my purposes here, it will not make a difference whether justifying 
reasons are identical to facts or facts “give” justifying reasons. Also, I say ‘con-
clusively’ because reasons are often taken to be pro tanto whereas being justified 
implies success. If reasons are pro tanto, then a justifying reason is a consideration 
that counts in favor of an action and is not overridden by other considerations.
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(~1.3) If identifying the fact that justifies the action with the  
 fact that the action is right is incoherent, then identifying  
 the property of being right with an FRM-property also   
 leads to incoherence.
The first step toward seeing that (~1.3) is true requires seeing how 
FRM-properties relate to justifying reasons. Assuming (as we are) 
that justifying reasons are facts, we can express the relation like this: 
a property F is an FRM-property iff a token action’s justifying reason 
is the fact in which the action possesses F. For example, if maximiz-
ing expected hedonic value is the one and only FRM-property, then 
what would justify an action would be the fact that the action maxi-
mizes expected hedonic value.
The second step toward seeing that (~1.3) is true requires rec-
ognizing that the following conditional is also true: If F is an FRM-
property just in case a token action’s justifying reason is the fact in 
which the action possesses F, then, on pain of incoherence, should 
F be an FRM-property, F cannot be identical to being right. To see 
why this conditional is true, suppose that a token action a possesses 
an FRM-property. If a possesses an FRM-property, then there is a 
fact in which a possess an FRM-property and, what is more, that fact 
justifies a. If the fact in which a possesses an FRM-property is what 
justifies a, then, trivially, some fact justifies a; and if some fact justi-
fies a, then a is justified. So, a’s possessing an FRM-property results 
in there being two facts: the fact in which a possesses the FRM-
property and the fact that a is justified. As explained above, how-
ever, we cannot identify the two facts. For, to do so would amount 
to claiming that that which justifies a is identical to the fact that a 
is justified, which is incoherent. So, the fact in which a possesses an 
FRM-property cannot be identical to the fact that a is justified. But 
the token action in both facts is one and the same action, viz., a. 
Consequently, if the properties in the two facts should also be one 
and the same property, then the facts themselves will be one and the 
same fact. To see this, suppose that it is a fact that a token organism 
o is a Brontosaurus and it is also a fact that o is an Apatosaurus. If being 
a Brontosaurus is identical to being an Apatosaurus, then the fact that 
o is a Brontosaurus and the fact that o is an Apatosaurus are the same 
fact—the fact just involves a property (viz., being a member of a 
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certain natural kind) picked out by two property-terms: ‘is a Bron-
tosaurus’ and ‘is an Apatosaurus’. But the facts are identical nonethe-
less. By parity of reasoning, then, if an FRM-property is identical 
to being justified, then the fact that justifies our token action a is 
identical to the fact that a is justified, which is incoherent. So, on 
pain of incoherence, no FRM-property can be identical to the prop-
erty of being justified; and since being right and being justified are 
one and the same property, it follows that no FRM-property can be 
identical to being right. Premise (~1.3) follows. Having already es-
tablished (~1.1) and (~1.2), we can now validly infer that identifying 
the property of being right with an FRM-property leads to incoher-
ence. Since (1) implies, to the contrary, that identifying the property 
of being right with an FRM-property is coherent, we can conclude 
that (1) is false. Since (1) is false, Byron’s objection to (P4*) fails; and 
since Jackson’s view of properties, when applied to moral properties, 
implies (1), we can also conclude that Jackson’s view of properties 
fails to account for moral properties, which ultimately casts a dubi-
ous light upon Jackson’s moral reductionism.
Finally, we can see why (P4*) is true. The particular explana-
tory relation cited in (P4*) prevents identifying the property that 
explains an action a’s being right with the property of being right, 
since (i) the property that explains a’s being right is, roughly put, 
the property whose possession by a is what justifies a11 and (ii) being 
right and being justified are one and the same property. For, if (i) the 
property that explains a’s being right is (roughly put) the property 
whose possession by a is what justifies a and (ii) being right and being 
justified are one and the same property, then to identify the property 
that explains a’s being right with the property of being right entails 
identifying that which justifies a with a’s being justified, which is 
incoherent. So, the particular explanatory relation, cited by (P4*), 
between the property that makes an action right and the property of 
being right makes it impossible to identify these two properties, in 
which case not only is (1) is false, but (P4*) is true.
11 If justifying reasons are facts, it would be more precise to say this: the prop-
erty that explains an action a’s being right is the property whose possession by a 
results in the fact that justifies a. This degree of precision is not required for the 
point being made in the text.
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Conclusion
In an earlier article, I argued that if the causal theory of reference is 
true, then, on pain of absurdity, no normative ethical theory is true 
(Long 2012). Michael Byron has objected to my argument—specifi-
cally, to the premise I have labelled ‘(P4*)’—by appealing to Frank 
Jackson’s moral reductionism. My defense of (P4*) is essentially that 
Byron fails to appreciate the particular explanatory relation, cited 
in (P4*), between the property that explains an action’s being right 
and the property of being right and that by getting clearer on this 
relation, we see not only that Byron’s objection fails, but that (P4*) 
is both true and calls into question Jackson’s account of moral prop-
erties and thus Jackson’s moral reductionism. What is more, we can 
once again conclude that if the causal theory of reference is true, 
then no normative ethical theory is true.12
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